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Introducing Evidence Obtained by an Illegal Search
and Seizure for Impeachment Purposes.
CRIMINAL LAW -

Commonwealth v. Wright, 415 Pa. 55, 202 A.2d 79 (1964).
The Pennnsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Wright' has,
for the first time, indicated that evidence obtained through an illegal
search and seizure can be admitted at trial to impeach a defendant's
credibility, even though Mapp v. Ohio2 states that such evidence may
not be used on the merits.
The defendant was arrested for a murder committed during the
perpetration of a robbery. 3 While the defendant was being held at
police headquarters, police detectives entered the defendant's resi1
dence without a search warrant and seized part of the holdup money. 4
The defendant was being tried for first degree murder under the
felony murder rule. Therefore it was necessary for the state to prove
the defendant's participation in the robbery in order to obtain a
conviction. The state was not permitted to use the holdup money in
its case against the defendant, 5 because it was secured in violation
of the fourth amendment. 6 However, on cross examination of the
defendant, the state was permittted to ask the defendant whether he
had received any of the holdup money. 7 Over objection, the defendant then testified that he did receive part of the money. The defendant objected to the question because it pertained to the exact evidence
that had been secured through an illegal search and seizure. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that this testimony was not admissible. 8 However, the court established that evidence obtained
1. 415 Pa. 55, 202 A.2d 79 (1964).
2. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Supreme Court held that all
evidence obtained by search and seizure in violation of the Constitution is
constitutionally inadmissible in state courts.
3. The defendant and one Daniel Clemons were perpetrating a robbery of a
cafe. During the course of the robbery, Clemons shot and killed the bartender.
4. The police detectives told the defendant's wife that her husband had confessed to his participation in the crime and had "sent them for the stuff." These
statements were untrue.
5. Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709 (1963).
6.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . ..
7. Record, p. 131a-134a, Commonwealth v. Wright, supra note 1.

8. Commonwealth v. Wright, supra note 1.
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through an illegal search and seizure can be admitted for impeachment purposes under certain conditions. In order to view this problem
in the proper context, it is necessary to review some of the landmark
cases in this area.
The United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States9 held
that evidence seized through an illegal search or in violation of the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution may not be used
substantively to prove a crime against a defendant. The essence of
the Weeks rule is, evidence so acquired shall not be used directly or
indirectly.10 This rule however, was only applicable to prosecutions
in the federal courts. The state courts were not required to follow it.
The Pennsylvania courts did not follow Weeks, and admitted any
evidence that helped prove the defendant guilty of a crime.' 1 After
Weeks, the United States Supreme Court in Mapp forced the rule in
Weeks on all the state courts. After Mapp, as they were required,
2
the Pennsylvania courts began applying the rule.'
The prohibition enunciated in Weeks is not an absolute one for
after Weeks the United States Supreme Court, in Walder v. United
States,' 3 stated that evidence seized through an illegal search and
seizure can be used to impeach a defendant's credibility if certain
conditions are met. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Wright,
follows the Walder case which established the criteria necessary to
make such evidence admissible in Pennsylvania courts. The court in
Wright, explicitly stated:
To make such evidence available for impeachment purposes and thereby constitute a waiver by the defendant of
his constitutional protection against its use, three conditions
are essential: (1) The defendant must elect to take the
stand; (2) His testimony which conflicts with the illegally
secured evidence must do more than deny the elements of
the crime for which he is being tried; (3) The inadmissible
evidence should be received only to the extent that its does
not admit the very acts which are essential elements of the
crime charged. ' 4
9.
10.
11.

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
Commonwealth v. Dugan, 143 Pa. Super. 383, 18 A.2d 84 (1941).

12. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963). Held, evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure may not be used in state
courts for any purpose.
13.
14.

Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
Commonwealth v. Wright, supra note 1 at 60, 202 A.2d at 81.
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The court stated that this exception to the exclusionary rule of
Week8 "concerns itself only with perjurious testimony directly made
1
by the defendant in his examination in chief."'
The lower court, in applying the rule in Walder to the Wright
case, foresaw that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would follow
the federal law in regard to the use of suppressed evidence for impeachment purposes. This court held that the defendant on direct
examination implied 1 6 that he didn't receive any of the money and
thus, opened the door to the state's cross examination. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in admitting
this evidence because the facts of Wright do not meet the necessary
conditions advanced in Walder. The supreme court stated that the
defendant's testimony in chief was no more than a denial of the
7
elements of the crime charged.1
The facts in Wright can be distinguished from Walder in that the
defendant in Walder, on direct examination, blatantly perjured himself in relation to a tangible physical fact - his prior possession of
a narcotic capsule.1 8 The United States Supreme Court stated that
the evidence was admissible for impeachment purposes, as the defendant had gone beyond a mere denial of the crime. "
There is no Pennsylvania precedent dealing with the use of suppressed evidence for purposes of impeachment. Wright is the first
Pennsylvania case that deals with this point, and in doing so, the
court is strictly adhering to the rule in Walder. It seems that the
Mapp decision had more of an influence on the Pennsylvania courts
than meets the eye, because since Mapp, the Pennsylvania courts have
been following, as required, federal case law as to the exclusionary
15.

Ibid.

16. Record, p. 215a, Commonwealth v. Wright, supra note 1.
17. Commonwealth v. Wright, supra note 1.
18. On direct examination the defendant testified that he had never dealt in
narcotics. To impeach him, the United States was permitted to introduce testimony pertaining to a narcotic capsule, which was seized from him previously,
and suppressed in another action which had been dismissed.
19. The Supreme Court stated that "The Constitution guarantees a defendant
the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be free to
deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave
to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it
and therefore not available for its case in chief. Beyond that, however there is
hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious
testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility
.... Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion on the
fourth amendment."
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rule enunciated in Weeks. And the Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicates that it will also follow the federal law as to the Walder exception of the Weeks rule, which under Mapp it is not required to do.
JOHN W.

LATELLA

TORTS - Statute of Limitations - Claims for Damages for Personal
Injury - Under Uniform Commercial Code, statute of limitations
for personal injury claims now four years, instead of two.
Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612.
In the case of Gardinerv. PhiladelphiaGas Works,' the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court enunciated a somewhat startling and far-reaching
rule of law. It interpreted certain provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code 2 to mean that there is now a four year statute of limitations for all actions for personal injury arising out of a breach of a
contract of sale. In so doing, the court departed from a long-standing
rule which prescribed a two year statute of limitations for all such
actions. The facts of the case which brought about this change now
follow.
Due to an allegedly defective underground conduit maintained by
the defendant gas works, gas escaped into the home of the plaintiffs,
Mr. and Mrs. Gardiner, causing personal injury to them. Thereupon,
they instituted an assumpsit action in the Court of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia County for an alleged breach of "agreement, warranty, and promise." The plaintiffs maintained that under the contract of sale for gas, 3 the defendant impliedly and expressly warranted that the gas would be transmitted to them in a safe manner.
The injuries complained of were sustained on January 7, 1961. The
action was not commenced until January 15, 1963, exactly two years
and eight days later. The Gas Works filed a preliminary objection to
the complaint averring that plaintiffs' action was barred by the two
year statute of limitations on personal injury claims as set forth in
1. 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
2. Hereinafter referred to as the Code.
3. It is undisputed that the supplying of gas to the Gardiners' home on a
month-to-month basis falls within the definition of a "contract for sale" within
§2-106 of the Code, 12A P.S. §2-106.

